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Do you want to read the rest of this article? We use cookies to make interactions with our website easy and meaningful, to better understand the use of our services, and to tailor advertising. For further information, including about cookie settings, please read our Cookie Policy. By continuing to use this site, you consent to the use of cookies. I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type.

In two-sided markets such as payment cards and personal computer operating systems, two groups of agents interact with each other via a common network platform; the value of joining the network for agents in one group depends on the number of participants in the other group. In these markets, resource heterogeneity is represented by different sizes of existing networks; resource accumulation possesses all five characteristics of asset-stock accumulation summarized by Dierickx and Cool.

The unique resource accumulation process provides an isolating mechanism for large networks to sustain their resource and competitive advantages. Using two dynamic systems models, we show that resource heterogeneity i. The findings illustrate the importance of incorporating market context in the research of the resource-based view of competitive advantage.

Copyright c Blackwell Publishing Ltd In such an environment the equilibrium outcome may be indeterminate, or there may be multiple equilibria. Caillaud and Jullien analyzed the " chicken and egg " problems arising from the network externalities involved in competition between market makers or " matchmakers " in a different framework.

These issues are worthy of further exploration, but they require a more complicated model than we have employed here.

A more realistic model will have to account f Middlemen Versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange. We present a model in which the microstructure of trade in a commodity or asset is endogenously determined. Producers and consumers of a commodity or buyers and sellers of an asset who wish to trade can choose between two competing types of intermediaries: Market makers post publicly observable bid and ask prices, whereas the prices quoted by different middlemen are private information that can be obtained only through a costly search process.

We consider an initial equilibrium with which there are no market makers but there is free entry of middlemen with heterogeneous transactions costs. We characterize conditions under which entry of a single market maker can be profitable even though it is common knowledge that all surviving middlemen will undercut the market maker's publicly posted bid and ask prices in the postentry equilibrium.

The market maker's entry induces the surviving middlemen to reduce their bid-ask spreads, and as a result, all producers and consumers who choose to participate in the market enjoy a strict increase in their expected gains from trade. When there is free entry into market making and search and transactions costs tend to zero, bid-ask spreads of all market makers and middlemen are forced to zero, and a fully efficient Walrasian equilibrium outcome emerges.

Multihoming at one side reduces the access price set to the other side. Parker and Van Alstyne , Caillaud and Jullien , Armstrong , andHagiu analyze related determinants of pricing structure. Katsamakas and Bakos analyze platform investments in two-sided networks and the implications of different ownership structures. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights IPR. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights.

Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality.

Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination rather than the harmonization of IPR protection. As ad-supported firms provide a market that joins online advertisers and users [10], our work is connected to the two-sided market literature [21] [4] [3]. Studies in this area have been prolific in investigating the pricing and governance structures.

Ad-Supported Business Model Competition. This paper studies competitive strategies of firms that may acquire an ad revenue support in their business models. We take into account shifts in users' taste for ads and consider different styles of ad-supported business models. In three competitive settings asymmetric, ad-driven, and full competition , we analyze the price competition and the equilibrium business model choices.

Under all three settings, we show that firms may strategize to create differentiation through their exclusion or sponsorship of ads, or engage in Bertrand-type competition and rely solely on ad revenues. Our results also reveal that ad revenues intensify competition, suppress equilibrium prices and profits, and diminish the differentiation effect. Furthermore, the style of ad support that lessens ad aversion plays different roles in competitive settings studied.

Our work offers theoretical contributions to the literature of bundling by finding new equilibria in the context of bundling ads. Proposition 1 reveals properties that are consistent with prior works in two-sided markets [3, 29, 6].

In particular, optimal pricing is typically asymmetric, i. Functionality-rich Versus Minimalist Platforms: A Two-sided Market Analysis.

Should a new "platform" target a functionality-rich but complex and expensive design or instead opt for a bare-bone but cheaper one? This is a fundamental question with profound implications for the eventual success of any platform. A general answer is, however, elusive as it involves a complex trade-off between benefits and costs.

The intent of this paper is to introduce an approach based on standard tools from the field of economics, which can offer some insight into this difficult question. We demonstrate its applicability by developing and solving a generic model that incorporates key interactions between platform stakeholders.

The solution confirms that the "optimal" number of features a platform should offer strongly depends on variations in cost factors. More interestingly, it reveals a high sensitivity to small relative changes in those costs. The paper's contribution and motivation are in establishing the potential of such a cross-disciplinary approach for providing qualitative and quantitative insights into the complex question of platform design.

An example of this would be a tweet from company tagged with the author responsible for it. People and prod-ucts often have complementary relationships and we can think of them as forming a network. The Role of Twitter in the World of Business. This paper examines the services people seek out on Twitter and the integration of Twitter into businesses. Twitter has experienced tremendous growth in users over the past few years, from users sharing to the world what they had for lunch to their opinions on world events.

As a social media website, Twitter has become the third most popular behind only Facebook and YouTube. Its user base statistics ensure a wide audience for business to engage with.

However, many find this a daunting prospect as there are no set guidelines as to how business might use the service. The ability to post quick short messages for the whole of the social network to see has encouraged people to use this microblogging platform to comment and share attitudes on company brands and products.

The authors present how the business world is using the social network site as a new communication channel to reach customers and examine other possible uses for Twitter in a business context. This paper also discusses how Twitter plans to move forward and evolve with its service, ensuring that personal, business and third party developers' best interests are catered to. The latter is being pursued by ISIS. Understanding the current state of the NFC payment ecosystem: A graph-based analysis of market players and their relations.

The recent development of Near Field Communication NFC technology has enabled theemergence of payment services using mobile phones. Furthermore, this technologicalinnovation initiated an ongoing evolution concerning payment transactions.

Companies andresearchers project that the prevalent function of credit cards will be progressively substitutedby mobile devices. In this paper NFC is described in detail and a graphed based networkanalysis is performed to determine players and industries involved in the network as well as therelations, including conflicts, cooperation, or alliances between these actors.

We examine a platform's optimal two-sided pricing strategy while considering seller-side innovation decisions and price competition. We model the innovation race among sellers in both finite and infinite horizons.

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In the finite case, we analytically show that the platform's optimal seller-side access fee fully extracts the sellers' surplus, and that the optimal buyer-side access fee mitigates price competition among sellers. The platform's optimal strategy may be to charge or subsidize buyers depending on the degree of variation in the buyers' willingness to pay for quality; this optimal strategy induces full participation on both sides.

Furthermore, a wider quality gap among sellers' products lowers the optimal buyer-side fee but leads to a higher optimal seller-side fee. In the infinite innovation race, we perform computations to find the stationary Markov equilibrium of sellers' innovation rate. Our results show that when all sellers innovate, there exists a parameterization under which a higher seller-side access fee stimulates innovation.

We analyze the formation and competition of market intermediaries when there are positive participation externalities between the two sides of the market; negative participation externalities within the same side; competition with traditional market; and implicit coordination among potential participants.

The impact of implicit cooridination is studied in two ways. First, we develop both static models--which are appropriate when the number of potential participants is large--and dynamic models--which are appropriate when a limited number of participants observe each other's choices. Potential participants can better coordinate their decisions in the dynamic participation process.

Second, we assume that participation decisions are coordinated by a "pessimistic belief" about formation or entry of a new intermediary. In order to overcome the pessimism, the owner of an intermediary has to offer a fee schedule that implements her preferred outcome as the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

The theory explains when and in which direction "cross-subsidization" strategies appear and when the incumbent intermediary can deter entry profitably. Some economic strategists now assert that the greatest value in information goods is not created by thestrongest and most restrictive intellectual property protection.

Proponents of Open Source Software argue for value created by peer review and openly modifiable shared code. To explore these ideas, we articulate a balance of incentives as indexed by the length of time that software remains proprietary, and openness as indexed by the amount of the platform code base that an author releases to the developer community and users to promote the creation of new products.

We analyze the trade-off between early and late release based on a two-sided network externality that explores how the release of free information benefits those who develop as well as those who consume. We also introduce a framing innovation that places existing licenses in a space that suggests where unexplored socially optimal licenses might exist.

Design and Ownership of Two-Sided Networks: Implications for Internet Platforms. Many Internet intermediaries are two-sided networks, i. We develop a model that characterizes the value created by two-sided networks, and the allocation of that value across the two sides.

When the asymmetry of the network effects is large, then the side with the low network effect participates for free. We depart from existing networks literature by endogenizing the network effects and focusing on the network design resulting from investments in network effects.

We show that under certain assumptions about the returns to scale of available technologies, the design of a two-sided network is characterized by maximally asymmetric allocation of surplus independent of the ownership regime. Exceptions are cases where there is significant reusability of investment across sides, or the designer has little influence over the network effect i.

The optimal ownership is either ownership by the side enjoying the strongest inherent network effect, or by the side enjoying the design technology with the strongest return.

Dynamic Innovation in a Two-Sided Platform.

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We are interested in a two-sided platform, in which dynamic innovation plays a role in stimulating consumer demand that also drives firms' incentive to innovate. By explicitly modeling the price competition within the two-sided market, we study ways consumers' platform fee interacts with firms' pricing strategies on the platform. We find that by charging consumers a fee, the platform is not necessarily better off, because firms may subsidize this cost by lowering their prices in the market, which leads to lower transaction revenues and innovation rate.

Platform's revenues may also suffer if it shares firms' transaction revenues. Surprisingly, despite the platform fee, consumer welfare improves as a result of lower prices. However, these effects are not monotonic, and shifts in the opposite direction occur when firms switch to different pricing strategies, because consumers' platform fee also mitigates price competition between low- and high-quality firms.

Information Gatekeepers and Price Discrimination on the Internet. Network Effects and Multiple Adoption: The network effect has been a key factor in the competition in the information and telecommunication industries.

It is the general principle that the value of connecting to a network depends on the number of existing customers in the network. Usually, it is a positive feedback from consumers, and the self-reinforcement nature of the network effect makes the strong firms stronger and the weak firms weaker.

In the case of e-commerce, however, the power of network effects can be mitigated by userspsila multiple adoption of networks, which gives starting firms a chance to compete with strong incumbents.

This empirical study showed that, because of multiple adoption, smaller players can still exist in the face of a dominant player. Seeding growth at airports and airport cities: Insights from the two-sided market literature.

Airports are evolving from simple infrastructure providers to complex multiproduct,multiservice enterprises wherein consumption of one product cross-subsidizes the provision of others. Nowhere is this better seen than in the airport cities which are evolving around many mid and large sized airports. Rather than separate portfolio businesses which can smooth or augment airport revenue, these developments raise the prospect that airports are platforms for two-sided markets.

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Therefore after defining two-sided markets this paper will consider the concept's applicability to airports in a more extensive manner than has previously been the case, and use the theory to understand airport area growth processes. Our main focus will be on examining the business models of selected airport cities for the lessons that can be learned for contemporary airport and regional development strategy.

Apr J Compet Law Econ. Or, at least, it is a sui generis two-sided market. Unlike other platforms, such as Microsoft Windows operating system, credit cards, or night clubs, where a single transaction is performed via the platform, two different transactions take place on Google.

Users look for search results, while advertisers look for users' eyeballs. Whilst operating systems, credit cards, and night clubs would be meaningless if either of the two sides were missing, search engines like TV or newspapers can exist under different market configurations.

Indeed, in search engines network externalities run only from the number of users to advertisers, and not the other way around. This thesis is supported by the analysis of the existing literature on two-sided markets and the applications carried out so far to the economics of search engines. According to this analysis, a new construction of the relevant market where Google operates is proposed. Google operates as a retailer of eyeballs, or users' attention.

In the upstream market, on one side, it buys well-profiled eyeballs from large retailers, i. Then, it sells well-profiled eyeballs to advertisers in the downstream market.

Based on this market construction, the allegations against Google are analysed as alleged violations of competition law along this vertical chain.

Seller Diversity on a Two-Sided Platform. As two-sided markets flourish, platform owners face the problem of governing seller diversity. We further incorporate quality heterogeneity in the circular city model and derive closed-form solution of the equilibrium outcome. The results show that quality heterogeneity leads to higher profits for the platform.

Furthermore, rather than offering uniform support that increases the average quality, an effective strategy for the platform is to offer discriminatory support to sellers to enhance quality heterogeneity.

Designing business models that take into consideration the role of advertising support is critical to the success of online services. In this paper, we address the challenges of these business model strategies and compare different ad revenue models. We use game theory to model vertical differentiation in both monopoly and duopoly settings, in which online service providers may offer an ad-free service, an ad-supported service, or a combination of these services. Offering both ad-free and ad-supported services is the optimal strategy for a monopolist because ad revenues compensate for the cannibalistic effect of vertical differentiation.

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